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Case No. 20070740-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Mark Scott,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for four counts of burglary, a second
degree felony, two counts of theft, a second degree felony, and two counts of theft, a
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's jury convictions for burglary
and theft?
Standard of Review. A jury verdict is afforded great deference. State v.
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Therefore, the Court views "the evidence
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict."
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18,10 P.3d 346. The Court will not reverse the jury

verdict for insufficient evidence unless "the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have ertertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was
convicted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-202 (West 2004):

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: . . (b)
theft[.]
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-404 (West 2004):

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9):
The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . [a]n argument. The
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with four counts of burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), two counts of
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West
2004), and two counts of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-6-404 (West 2004). R29-31.
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted as
charged. R62; R208:205.
Sentence. The trial court imposed indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years
for each of the six felony counts and 180-day jail terms for each of the two
misdemeanor counts.

R173-74.

The trial court ordered all terms to run

concurrently. R174. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay a fine and to
make restitution to the two identified victims. R174-76.
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Rl77.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Seeking "payback" for a perceived injustice, Defendant and his teenage
son repeatedly burglarized Dennis Weaver's cabin, and two others, located in
remote Cache County, in Hardware Park Estates, during November 2005.
R208:4; see also R207:120,137,156; R208:26-30. Defendant's son knew that what
they were doing was wrong, but felt that he "had no choice in the matter. It was
either I do that or I get punished." R208:23; see also id. at 47.
*

* *

Dennis Weaver closed his cabin for the winter season on October 26, 2005.
R207:124-125. When he returned the day after Christmas, he found the cabin had
been burglarized, with many possessions stolen. Id. at 125. Roger Godfrey closed
his cabin on October 14, 2005. Id, at 157. He learned that it had been burglarized
only after his neighbor, Weaver, called to report it. Id. A third cabin was also looted
during the same time period, but the unidentified owner never reported his losses to
law enforcement. R208:19, 26-28.
Detective Talbot, of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, learned of the Cache
1

Defendant's brief recites the evidence in the light most favorable to his
version of the events. In keeping with well-established appellate practice, this brief
will recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Finder,
2005 UT 15 If 2,114 P.3d 551; State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60 | 2 , 6 P.3d 1116; State v.
Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996).
4

County burglaries while he was investigating Defendant for unrelated burglaries
and thefts in Weber County. Id. at 49-50. As part of that investigation, Detective
Talbot made frequent contact with Defendant's teenage son, Christopher, leaving
his business card, in case Christopher ever had any information he wanted to share.
Id. at 50; see also id at 23.
Following his parents' separation, and with the encouragement of his mother,
Defendant's then-wife, Cynthia, Christopher contacted Detective Talbot in October
2006. R208:50; see also R 207: 202,208,213; R208:26. Having decided that "what he
was doing to other people wasn't right," and that he "should tell Jason Talbot,"
Christopher admitted his own and Defendant's guilt in the Cache County cabin
burglaries. R208:25-26. According to Christopher, Defendant and he made four
consecutive night-time trips to the remote cabin area in the Fall of 2005. Id. at 19-22,
27.
A. First trip: burglary and theft of unknown person's cabin.2
The first night, they drove to the locked gate leading to Weaver's property.
Id. at 6. This initial gate allowed entrance into the Hardware Park Estates. R207:137.

2

The burglary and theft of the unknown person's cabin was charged in counts
five and six. See R30. Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that the jury could also
convict Defendant for counts five and six based on the second burglary and theft of
Weaver's cabin, which did not occur until the fourth night. See R208:174-75.
5

They stopped the truck, walked past the gate, and went into an unknown person's
cabin, entering though an unlocked sliding glass door. R208:6-7. Defendant and
Christopher stole "some food and stuff out of the first cabin." Id. at 6. Christopher
estimated that they stole approximately $100 worth of food. Id. at 19. Because their
backpacks were so heavy, Defendant and Christopher left them at the cabin and
returned to the gate. Id. at 7. They then drilled the locks, opened the gate, and
drove back to the cabin to retrieve their packs. Id. at 8.
Before leaving that night, Defendant and Christopher also drove to the gate
leading to Dennis Weaver's property, cutting that lock with bolt cutters. Id. at 8-9.
Because it was turning light, however, they did not then enter Weaver's cabin. Id. at
9; see also id. at 27. Cynthia recalled Defendant returning home with " a bunch of
canned goods, food. Some clothing, some -1 can't remember everything." R207:189.
B.

Second trip: first burglary and theft of Weaver's cabin.3
The next night, Defendant and Christopher made a second trip to Weaver's

cabin. R208:9, 27. Defendant pried open the back door with a pry bar. Id. at 9.
They took "almost everything that was in the cabin food wise," approximately $200
worth. R207:137; R208:19-20. They also took a Remington .22 rifle, a couple of
3

The first burglary and theft of Weaver's cabin was charged in counts one
and two. See R29-30; see also R20&170-71.
6

spotting scopes, nearly all of the bank of batteries used to power the cabin, a
Craftsman drill, and a power inverter. R207:128,132; R208:10,14. The stolen goods
were stored in a semi-trailer borrowed from Defendant's then-employer, Bobby
Eliason. R208:15.
C. Third trip: first burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin,4
The third night, Defendant"wanted to go back and see if there was anything
else left in there/7 Id. at 16. Rather than revisiting Weaver's cabin, however,
Defendant and Christopher broke into Godfrey's cabin, "a cabin above Dennis
Weaver's." Id. at 17. They stole many items including a generator, two solar panels,
solar batteries, alcohol, a trailer, R208:17, two 4-D batteries, four deep cycle batteries,
id. at 20, a .22 rifle, id. at 18, a Direct TV system, generator, R207:160, Mandella,
cordless drill, air compressor, and various other items. See R207:165-70. These stolen
items were also stored in the semi-trailer, alongside Weaver's possessions. R208:21.5
4

The first burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin was charged in counts three
and four. R30; R208:172-73.
5

Prior to Defendant's trial, Godfrey was prosecuted for making false
statements to a law enforcement officer regarding the number of things taken from
his cabin. R207:173-74. Godfrey received punishment for this class B misdemeanor,
including probation, community service, a fine, and was required to attend a
thinking errors counseling class. Id. at 182. Although the initial report contained
false statements, many items in the report were recovered and returned to Godfrey
by the police. Id. at 164-165,166,170-172.

7

D. Fourth trip: second burglary and theft of Godfrey's and Weaver's
cabins,6
On the fourth night, Defendant, Christopher, and Brandon another of
Defendant's sons and Christopher's half-brother returned to the Hardware Park
Estates, where they again broke into both Weaver's and Godfrey's cabins, "and got a
little more stuff." R208:21; see also id. at 22,28-30,36. In particular, they took more
alcohol from Godfrey's cabin, or about "every bottle that was almost in there," id. at
22, leaving only two bottles behind. R207:161. The stolen goods were again stored
in the semi-trailer, and Brandon took two totes full of alcohol home with him.
R208:22.
Christopher told Detective Talbot that the stolen cabin property could be
found in two semi-trailers, belonging to Eliason, Defendant's former employer, and
also in Parnell Green's shop, Richochet Trucking, where Defendant was then
employed. R208:53-54; see also id. at 11-12. And it was. See, e.g., R208:55-57.
According to Eliason, Defendant borrowed the two trailers from him to move
his belongings, but when Defendant kept them longer than expected, Eliason put
pin locks in the trailers to prevent Defendant from taking them. R208:94-95.
6

The second burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin was charged in counts
seven and eight. R30; R208:175-76. As noted, in n.2 supra, the second burglary and
theft of Weaver's cabin was charged in counts five and six. R208:174-75.
8

Defendant still managed to take the trailers, but Eliason successfully retrieved them
before they were to be impounded. R208:95.
Defendant contacted law enforcement after Eliason reclaimed his trailers,
R208:95-96, claiming that Eliason had stolen the trailers and $100,000 of tools and
other goods inside. R208:143. A warrant was issued for Eliason's arrest. R208:96.
When police arrived to arrest Eliason, however, he was able to prove his ownership
of the trailers. R208:95-96. Inside the trailers, officers found much of the stolen
property Defendant and Christopher had taken from the cabins. R208:95-96; see also
id. at 55-56.
Stolen property was also found in Green's shop. R208:103. After Defendant
had to move off of Eliason's property, Green offered Defendant a mechanic's job
and allowed him to buy a trailer to live in. R208.100. Green allowed Detective
Talbot inside his shop and opened the trailers. R208:103. The evidence found in all
locations "ended up being close to four semi trailers full/' R208:82.
In addition to the above evidence, Defendant spoke of his desire to burglarize
Weaver's cabin to both Cynthia and Christopher. R207:188. Defendant and Weaver
had known each other for about seven years. R207:147. Weaver rented property to
Defendant in Weber County. Id. at 122. Defendant, Cynthia, and Christopher, also
lived in a travel trailer on the property. Id. at 186. After Defendant accumulated 809

100 cars on the property, however, city officials informed Weaver that he would
need to remove the cars because of zoning regulations. Id. at 122. Weaver helped
Defendant move the cars off the property to Defendant's new rental. Id. at 122-23.
When Defendant didn't have the money to pay the rent at the new property,
Weaver loaned him $200. Id. at 123. Weaver also helped Defendant's family over
the years, bringing them items "for one Christmas" "{s]ome food one other time"
and //[s]ome clothing to kind of help him out." Id. at 123-124. Cynthia believed that
Weaver had "helped [them] out quite a bit," and helped Defendant find jobs or paid
Defendant to do odd jobs for Weaver.

Id. at 186. Weaver took Defendant

snowmobiling and they visited his cabin. Id. at 124,149. Weaver also spent time
with Christopher. Id. at 150. Christopher had been to Weaver's cabin "a couple of
times and spent a couple of different nights there." Id. According to Cynthia,
"[Defendant] said that he was going to go up and see what he could get from
Dennis because he figured Dennis owed him for losing whatever he lost on the
property we were staying at." R207:188. Christopher heard Defendant say that he
wanted "payback to Dennis Weaver." R208:5.
Finally, Defendant and Christopher were identified in the area of the
cabins on four occasions, in a truck towing a trailer. R208:146,147,148. A Weber
County Deputy Sheriff pulled Defendant over on three occasions in 2005, on
10

October 8, November 21, and December 28. R 208:146,147. Each time Defendant
was driving with Christopher in the same vehicle, pulling a trailer with a light
problem. Id. A Riverdale City officer also saw Defendant and Christopher in a
truck towing a trailer in March of 2005. R208:147-48. Each of these occurrences
was in the early hours of the morning, between 3:16 a.m. and 5:28 a.m. R208:146,
147,148.
Defendant did not testify at trial and did not call any witnesses. R208:161; see
also 156-57. In closing argument, trial counsel theorized that the "most likely
candidate in all of [the crimes]" was Christopher, R208: 192, and that "there's as
much evidence now that it was Brandon as there is that it was [Defendant]," who
committed the crimes with Christopher. R208:187. In support, trial counsel argued
that "the only thing the state has is Chris's statement and he points the finger at his
dad." R208:180. Trial counsel also emphasized the lack of fingerprint evidence
connecting Defendant to the crimes. R208:181, 189-91. Finally, trial counsel
challenged Cynthia's testimony because she was divorcing Defendant and fighting
for custody of Christopher. R208:188. Cynthia also had a conviction for use of
methamphetamines and admitted to using drugs with Christopher. Id.

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
jury convictions for multiple counts of burglary and theft should be rejected for
several reasons. First, it is inadequately briefed. Second, he has not marshaled
the evidence. Third, the evidence in fact sufficed to support the jury verdicts.
Therefore, Defendant has not, and cannot, show either plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS
JURY CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT
A. Defendant's sufficiency challenge to his multiple convictions for
burglary and theft is inadequately briefed.
In Point I of his brief, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his jury convictions on multiple charges of burglary and theft, asserting that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

Aplt. Br. at 13-16.

Specifically, Defendant asserts that" [t]he defense pointed out that it is very obvious
in this case that there is a lot of inconsistencies] in testimonies. There were at least
a few things said by almost everyone who testified, that were inconsistent with
previous statements/7 Aplt. Br. at 15-16. These two sentences constitute the sum

12

total of Defendant's insufficiency analysis. See id. Accordingly, Defendant's
sufficiency challenge is inadequately briefed and should not be considered. See State
v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, % 15, 72 P.3d 138 (refusing to consider inadequately
briefed argument) (citation omitted); Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah
1998).
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to
include his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented/'
including "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be
addressed on appeal See State v. Warelwm, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'[A]
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)).
Here, Defendant's four-page insufficiency argument contains citation to, and
discussion of, pertinent case authority, but as noted, his actual analysis of the
claimed insufficiency constitutes all of two sentences. See Aplt. Br. 15-16. This
Court has previously recognized that "a one-sentence assertion that the action ...
was improper" is inadequate. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT
App 207, \ 17 n. 5,186 P.3d 1012. Defendant nowhere applies the cited authorities
13

to the facts of this case. Aplt. Br. at 13-16. Moreover, he nowhere identifies the
elements of burglary or theft that he believes to have been insufficiently proven, let
alone demonstrates how the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, is
insufficient.

Aplt. Br. at 13-16. Defendant states that he "is cognizant of the

requirement to marshal evidence in support of the jury's verdict/' and submits that
"he has done [so] in the setting forth the facts." Aplt. Br. at 15. But the fact section
of Defendant's brief is also inadequate. Defendant summarizes the testimony of
only four of eleven witnesses and only occasionally supports his characterizations of
the testimony with specific record cites. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12. Defendant thus fails to
make any clear assertions connecting the facts, as heard by the trial court, to the
standards required for a claim of insufficient evidence. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,
248-50 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1109 (Utah App. 1995).
Accordingly, "[Defendant's arguments are imprecise as to the exact errors being
alleged, providing at best, very cursory analyses." Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.,
2008 UT App 207, ! 1 7 n . 5.
This Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31, 973 P.2d 404
(quoting Bishop, 753 P.23d at 450)); accord State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Defendant's claim of insufficient evidence
14

and error in denying his motion to dismiss should be rejected. See Jaeger, 1999 UT1,
^ 31 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to lack of meaningful analysis of
cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal
where brief "wholly lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to support [Wareham's]
argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v.
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).7
B. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence and shown that it is
insufficient.
As noted, one of the reasons Defendant's brief is inadequate is his failure to
marshal the evidence. To succeed on his insufficiency claim, Defendant must
marshal all of the evidence and demonstrate that it fails to establish the elements of
7

In Point II of his brief, Defendant claims that trial counsel performed
ineffectively for not moving to arrest judgment. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. This claim is also
inadequately briefed. Defendant cites and discusses case authority, but never
relates the authorities cited to the facts of this case, or the claimed deficient
performance. Indeed, Defendant never explains why a motion to arrest judgment
would have been successful. Rather, Defendant broadly asserts only that no such
motion was made, that it is "[t]he general practice of defense counsel in criminal
trials to move for a motion to arrest the judgment/' and that "[t]his is especially true
when the conviction is not based on substantial reliable evidence/' Aplt. Br. at 20.
Later in the brief, Defendant broadly asserts that ''there is simply no reason for trial
counsel not to move the court to arrest the judgment when the evidence against the
Defendant was so unreliable." Aplt. Br. at 24. Defendant's argument is devoid of
any analysis of the facts and citation to the record. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. Given these
failures, Defendant's Point II is devoid of meaningful analysis. Accordingly,
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim is inadequately briefed and should also be
rejected.
15

burglary and theft. Marshaling is thus an "arduous and painstaking" process. West
Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 R2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, it
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenge must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous.
Id. This marshaling process "serves the important function of reminding litigants
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Such
deference is especially appropriate where the fact finder is a jury, whose common
sense is a valued buffer between the parties." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732., 739 (Utah
App. 1990).
Accordingly, when applying the marshaling standard in a jury setting, as
here, this Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
will reverse "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citations
omitted); see also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378,381 (Utah App. 1992) (quotations and
16

citations omitted). "When findings of all required elements of the crime can be
reasonably made from the evidence," however, "including the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from it, [the reviewing court] stop[s] [its] inquiry and sustain[s]
the verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 42,994 P.2d 177.
Here, Defendant claims to have met this heavy burden in the fact section of
his brief.

Aplt. Br. at 15 ("Defendant submits that even with an extensive

marshaling of the evidence (which he has done in the setting forth the facts) the
jury's verdict cannot be supported"). Defendant's claim notwithstanding, he has
not properly marshaled the evidence, because instead of viewing the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts, he argues the evidence in
the light most favorable to acquittal. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12. For example, Defendant
never acknowledges evidence that the stolen property was found in the semi-trailers
he borrowed from his former employer Eliason, and inside his private area of
Green's shop. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12; see also R208:53-56. Nor does he mention
evidence that he and Christopher were stopped in the area of the cabins on three
different occasions during the time period that the cabins were burglarized. See
Aplt. Br. at 6-12; see also R208:146-48. Each time Defendant was driving with
Christopher in the same vehicle, pulling a trailer with a light problem. R208:146-48.
Each of these occurrences occurred in the early hours of the morning, between 3:16
17

a.m. and 5:28 a.m.

Id. This objective evidence corroborates Cynthia's and

Christopher's testimony implicating Defendant as the instigator and primary culprit
in the cabin burglaries. See, e.g., R207:188-90,213; R208:3-49. The jury verdicts are
thus well-supported.
Instead of marshalling the evidence, Defendant merely suggests that it is
insufficient because "there [was] a lot of inconsistent testimonies. There were at
least a few things said by almost everyone who testified, that were inconsistent with
previous statements/' Aplt. Br. at 15-16. But even assuming that constituted proper
marshaling, "the existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences
does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91,97 (Utah
1982) (citation omitted). Thus, even where the evidence is susceptible to multiple
inferences, so long as the inferences drawn by the jury were reasonable, the verdictmust be upheld. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 43; Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381.
C. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not, and cannot,
show either plain error or ineffective assistance.
Defendant asserts that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte entering a
directed verdict based on the alleged insufficient evidence, and that trial counsel
rendered deficient performance in not moving to arrest the judgment. Aplt. at 13,
16, 17-25. Assuming arguendo that Defendant's brief is adequate for review,
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Defendant cannot prevail on either claim because he has not shown that the
evidence was in fact insufficient to support his convictions.
When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for a
directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party moved against/7 State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, % 7,105 P.3d 951 (quotation
and citation omitted). The Court then "appl[ies] the same standard used when
reviewing a jury verdict" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 41,70 P.3d 111. The trial
court's decision will be affirmed if "some evidence exists from which a reasonable
jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, If 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted).
Assuming no motion is made, and the claim, as here, is that the trial court
plainly erred for not sua sponte directing a verdict, an appellant must show "'first
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime[s] charged
and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial
court erred in submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,f32,
55 P.3d 1131 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10
P.3d 346).
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1. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not shown that
the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, for not sua sponte
entering a directed verdict.
To prove burglary, the State must prove that a defendant "enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit ...
theft." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). For purposes of finding a
Defendant guilty of a second degree felony, the State must prove that the burglary
"was committed in a dwelling." Id.
To prove theft, the State must prove that a defendant "obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004).
Here, the State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that the elements of burglary and theft had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Christopher testified that he and the Defendant entered three cabins over the course
of four nights. R208:19-22,27-30,36. The cabins belonged to Weaver, Godfrey, and
an unidentified person. Id. Weaver and Godfrey's cabins were each entered on two
different occasions and items were taken from each cabin both times. Id. The door
to Weaver's cabin was "pried open and jimmied." R207:126. Defendant and
Christopher took nearly all of the food stored therein, a Craftsman drill, .22
Remington rifle, spotting scopes, binoculars, and flashlights. R207:127,132,133,135,
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136. Defendant and Christopher gained access to Godfrey's cabin by prying a
window out of its frame. R207:157-58. They took Godfrey's solar panels, Direct TV
system, generator, solar panel batteries, nearly all of his liquor, an air compressor,
and many other assorted items. R207:159-61, 163-170. The third owner was not
identified, but Christopher testified to the entry and the approximately $100 worth
of food that was stolen from the cabin. R208:6-7,19. Cynthia, Defendant's wife, also
confirmed that she saw the items taken from the unknown person's cabin. R207:189.
Christopher, Weaver, and Godfrey each testified that Defendant did not have
permission to enter any of the three cabins. R208:22-23; R207:137; see also R207:15556. Defendant told Cynthia that he was planning "to go up and see what he could
get from Dennis [Weaver] because he figured [Weaver] owed him," R207:188, and
that "he saw other cabins that he was going to go back up and check out." R207:190.
Also, two of Defendant's former employers testified about the trailers that the stolen
goods were eventually found in. See R208:91-107; see also id. at 53-55. This evidence
suffices to prove that Defendant unlawfully entered the three dwellings, and
obtained unauthorized control over the property of the three owners with the
purpose to deprive each of their property. The evidence thus sufficed to support
Defendant's conviction for eight counts of burglary and theft, beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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Given the above, Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim.
Defendant has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions, let alone "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ]f 32
(quotation and citation omitted).
2. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not shown that
the trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to arrest the
judgment
As noted, Defendant also claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively for
not moving to arrest the judgment. Aplt. Br. at 17-25.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both
prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which holds that
such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); see
also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). A defendant's burden is
extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can "succeed[ ] only when no
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and quotations
omitted).

Moreover, counsel is not deficient for not making futile motions.
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Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does
not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34,989 P.2d 52
(quotations and citations omitted).
Here, as explained under Part C(l), the State presented evidence sufficient to
support a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the
Cache County cabin burglaries and thefts. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant
cannot show that counsel performed deficiently for not moving to arrest the
judgment, particularly where trial counsel had already unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss. See R208:151. Moreover, because the evidence sufficed, Defendant also
cannot show that he was prejudiced. He cannot show that, had counsel moved to
arrest judgment, the trial court would have granted the motion or that the outcome
would have been different.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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